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Introduction 
Like the other formerly communist countries, Czechoslovakia commenced its 
transformation process from a position of extreme state ownership of the economy. 
Czechoslovakia was in fact exceptional in that the extent of etatization was greater 
than in most other socialist economies - only 1.2% of the labor force, 2% of all 
registered assets and a negligible fraction of the nation's GDP belonged to the 
private sector in 1989. This low share did not change very much in 1990, when 
official statistics till attributed only 4% of GDP to the private sector. As can be 
seen from Table 1, in 1992 the private sector started to grow rapidly in retail trade 
and construction, mostly as a result of restitutions and small scale privatization. In 
contrast, industry remained predominantly in state hands throughout the first half 
of 1993 and it was not until the second half of 1993 that the share of private owner- 
ship in industry increased as a result of the massive transfer of shares of enterprises 
in the large scale privatization program. 
Table 1 - SHARE OF PRIVATE SECTOR ON OUTPUT IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC, 
1990-mid 1993 (%) 
1990 1991 1992 1993" 
GDP 4.0 11.0 19.15 44.2 
Industrial production n.a. n.a. 14.5 17.6 
Construction n.a. n.a. 46.0 60.2 
Retail trade n.a. n.a. 66.1 75.0 
* January to June. 
n.a. not available 
Source: Czech Statistical Office, CNB. 
The issue of privatization attracted considerable attention immediately after the 
fall of the communist regime in November 1989. It was addressed by the electoral 
programs of virtually all political parties in the first free elections in post-com- 
munist Czechoslovakia in June 1990, and the resulting legislation and practices re- 
lated to privatization evolved into three main strands. First came the restitution 
laws which legislated the return of certain types of property to previous owners. 
Second was the so-called 'small scale privatization', used mostly for privatizing 
smaller units in public auctions. Last, but in terms of its scale the most important 
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was the 'large scale privatization', an approach covering large as well as medium- 
size firms and involving methods ranging from auctions, tenders and direct sales to 
the widely publicized voucher method. It also allowed free transfer of property to 
municipalities, health insurance companies and other publicly beneficial 
institutions. Across these three strands of privatization ran a free transfer of 
property to municipalities, which sometimes eventually resulted in a further transfer 
to private owners. 
All of these privatization programs aimed at promoting the emerging private 
sector but they had different effects. From the financial standpoint the most impor- 
tant program was clearly that of large scale privatization - by 30 June 1993, 597 
billion Czechoslovak koruna (Kcs) worth of property was approved for privatization 
under this program, with Kcs 278 billion of property being distributed via the 
voucher scheme alone. Moreover, about 6,000 municipalities received free property 
transfers worth Kcs 350 billion in 1991 and additional property was distributed to 
municipalities within the large scale privatization program in the two following 
years. Property transferred in restitutions amounted to between Kcs 75 and 125 
billion. Finally, sales carried out in the small privatization program amounted to 
Kcs 31 billion. In comparison, the role of foreign direct investment was small as it 
equalled only Kcs 58.2 billion between 1January 1990 and 30 September 1993. 
In this paper we provide a descriptive analysis of the three privatization pro- 
grams in the Czech and Slovak Republics. After introducing the relevant 
institutions in section 1, we examine in detail the background ebate, legal basis 
and implementation f the restitution, small privatization and large privatization 
programs in sections 2, 3 and 4, respectively. The role of foreign investment is
examined in section 5 and conclusions are presented in section 6.1 
1. Key Institutions in the Privatization Process 
A number of institutions played a part in the privatization process. Until 1 Janu- 
ary 1993, the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Federal Fund of National Prop- 
erty were the important institutions at the federal evel. At the national evels, the 
most important institutions were the Czech and Slovak Ministries of Privatization, 
Funds of National Property, Ministries of Finance, various founding ministries of 
state-owned enterprises, and the City and District Privatization Committees, which 
were created expressly for the sake of privatization. 
Ministries of Privatization (officially called the 'Ministry for Administration of 
National Property and its Privatization') were established in the Czech and Slovak 
republics after first free elections in the second half of 1990. They have had a broad 
agenda. First, they were responsible for certain restitution cases by collecting claims 
for financial compensation and formally approving all decisions to privatize units 
via auctions within the small and large scale privatization. While the Ministries' 
role in the process of small privatization was restricted to making simple yes or no 
decisions, their role in large scale privatization has been a very active one - the 
Ministries have often entered into negotiations with individuals and institutions 
submitting privatization proposals and sometimes they have significantly altered 
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privatization projects. 
The Czech, Slovak and Federal Funds of National Property were established in
1991 as units accountable directly to the relevant Parliaments rather than the ex- 
ecutive branches of the individual governments. 2 They were designed to be the 
repositories of the financial proceeds of privatization and to make compensation 
payments within the restitution program. Within the large scale privatization pro- 
gram, they have been the institutions in which property formally changes hands 
after a privatization project has been approved by all the relevant decisionmakers. 
In this context, the Funds have not been supposed to alter or renegotiate he terms 
of the deal. 
Many republican (and before 1993 also federal) Ministries have played the part 
of the founding Ministries. As part of the centrally planned system, each state- 
owned enterprise was under the jurisdiction of a particular branch ministry. Each of 
these ministries controlled a given branch of the economy (e.g., manufacturing, 
heavy engineering, construction, domestic trade, and so on). Since the 1989 revo- 
lution, the number of branch ministries has been progressively reduced. In the 
Czech republic, for example, there is now only one ministry covering industry and 
trade and one overseeing agriculture. A few enterprises also fall under the minis- 
tries of health or cultural affairs. 
While still in existence, the Federal Ministry of Finance had two tasks within 
the privatization process. First, it played the part of a privatization ministry with re- 
spect o federal enterprises. Second, it was in charge of organizing voucher privati- 
zation (i.e., the distribution of vouchers to citizens, maintaining all the relevant 
documentation a d implementing price adjustments seeking to equalize demand for 
shares with the given supply)) For this purpose a special branch of the Federal 
Ministry of Finance, the Center for Voucher Privatization, was established in 1991. 
Finally, the republican Ministries of Finance played a part in the restitution 
process. 
2. Restitution: Returning Property to former Owners 
From the very start of the privatization debate, restitution has been an extremely 
controversial subject. The advocates of restitution have argued that the reintroduc- 
tion of private property as a central institution in the economy requires the restora- 
tion of the general public's confidence in the constitutional nd legal protection of 
private property. The state must thus demonstrate its determination to protect pri- 
vate property by returning what was unconstitutionally expropriated from private 
owners. 
With the exception of hardline communists and some other highly visible 
groups, most opponents of restitution basically agreed with the spirit of this argu- 
ment. They insisted, however, that the price in terms of long-lasting legal disputes 
(and hence legal uncertainty) would be too high. Moreover, legalizing restitution 
would open the Pandora's box of further claims, thus hindering any reasonable r - 
structuring, privatization, and establishment of joint ventures by freezing all prop- 
erty transactions (including privatization itself) until property stakes have been de- 
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termined. 4 In the view of these opponents, one may reintroduce private property 
only after a 'bold line has been drawn below the accounts of the past forty years'.5 
Obviously, a similar debate took place in all the other Central and East 
European countries. Yet, the only other country that has carried out massive, in- 
kind (natural) restitutions is East Germany, where the process came about 
principally because of the adoption of the West German legal system [see, for 
example, Siebert H., 1991]. In contrast, Hungary has for instance focused on 
financial compensation, with the claimants receiving restitution warranties -
voucher-like securities entitling the claimants to purchase any privatized property. 
In this system the claimant herefore has a general right to reacquire property but 
he/she does not have the automatic right to obtain the very property he/she lost 
through nationalization. 
The Czechoslovak solution is in a sense an intermediate one: it allows the natu- 
ral restitution of property that was expropriated after the Communist akeover of 
1948 but, since a major part of the Czechoslovak economy was nationalized before 
1948, natural restitution accounts for a smaller share of the total nationalized prop- 
erty than in the German case. Moreover, as we discuss below, financial restitutions 
are permitted only in specific circumstances. 6 
2.1. The Legal Framework for Restitutions 
At the federal evel, the Parliament adopted three major laws dealing with the 
eligibility for and decisionmaking about restitutions (Table 2). Laws passed at the 
republican levels dealt with technical or minor administrative problems. After the 
split of Czechoslovakia, the three federal laws were incorporated into the legal 
frameworks of the Czech and Slovak republics. 
Table 2 - TIMETABLE OF RESTITUTIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
Number and Abbreviated Name of the Law Valid From Claim Due Until 
No. 403/1990 Mitigation of Property-Related Injustices 
No. 87/1991 Out-of-Court Rehabilitations 
- Returning Property 
- Financial Compensation 
No. 229/1991 Restitution fLand and Other Agricultural 
PrOF, ert ), 
1 Nov. 1990 2 May 1991 
1 April 1991 
1 Oct. 1991 
I Apr. 1992 
24 June 1991 31 Dec. 1992 
The three laws have several common features. First, only property nationalized 
after the Communist takeover of 1948 is to be returned, a principle which excludes 
property nationalized by the democratically elected government between 1945 and 
1948 - the banks, steel industry, insurance companies, factories with more than 500 
employees, joint stock companies and some other classes of property. Second, the 
restitution laws cover only property that was personally (directly) owned by the 
citizens; property of corporations, cooperatives and other associations i not subject 
to restitution. Finally, restitution claims could be submitted solely by owners, heirs 
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and family members, provided they were Czechoslovak citizens and permanent 
residents of Czechoslovakia when submitting the claim. 
In all three laws, the major approach to resfituting property is to transfer it in its 
present form; in some cases, this system may be substituted for or accompanied by 
financial compensation. In most cases the claimant has to submit heir written re- 
quest o the present owner (in most cases a state owned enterprise or a cooperative), 
who is required to hand over the property within a period of time specified in each 
law. Enterprises with foreign capital participation (being under the protection of 
Law no. 173/1988) and foreign governments are exempted from this obligation. 
Private owners are also exempt, provided they acquired the property in accordance 
with the law valid at the time. In these cases the claimant is entitled to financial 
compensation paid by the State. In cases where the nature of the property has been 
significantly altered since nationalization, an additional financial settlement may be 
required. K the property has been improved, the claimant may opt for financial 
compensation r receive the property if they pay the difference between the official 
estimated price of the property before and after the improvement. 
Except for a law returning certain property of the Catholic Church, the first law 
on pfivatization was the Law on Mitigation of Certain Property-Related Injustices 
(no. 403/1990), adopted by the Czechoslovak Parliament on 2 October 1990. The 
law applies to property expropriated in the late 1950s, primarily on the basis of 
government decree no. 15/1959 (issued eleven years after the main wave of na- 
tionalization). The law applies mostly to real (immovable) property as well as cer- 
tain types of movable property (chattel) used by the state sector but still officially 
owned by private individuals on the basis of law no. 71/1959. The law also covers 
nationalizations carried out by administrative fiat without any legal ground. The 
law stipulated that claims had to be submitted between 1 November 1990 and 2 
May 1991. The current holders of the property were obliged to txansfer it to the 
legal claimants within 60 days. 
The Law on Out-of-Court Rehabilitation (no. 87/1991) was passed in February 
1991. This law covers a wide range of wrongdoing suffered by Czechoslovak citi- 
zens under the communist regime. In the sphere of property rights it repeals all 
laws and administrative acts from the period 25 February 1948 - 1 January 1990. It 
also sets the rules for restituting property confiscated during criminal prosecutions 
of citizens under certain politically motivated laws and for restitutions related to 
forced sales and cases when citizens gave up property or refused inheritance under 
government duress. 7 In practice, courts tended to be liberal in interpreting duress 
and most 'gifts' to the state could hence be successfully claimed back. Claims had 
to be submitted within 6 months after the passage of the law (i.e., l April-1 Octo- 
ber 1991) and current owners were obliged to turn over the property within 30 days 
of receiving the claim. 
The third major restitution law (no. 229/1991), regulating the Restitution of 
Land and Other Agricultural Property, was adopted in May 1991. This law permits 
restitutions of property nationalized as part of a land reform, confiscated in con- 
nection with criminal prosecution for political reasons, given up as forced sales and 
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donations, and refused as inheritance under duress. Moreover, the law applies to 
cases when property was taken over by cooperatives after property owners joined as 
coop members. Some of this property remained in the possession of the private 
owners but it was effectively controlled by the cooperatives or state organizations. 
The law also stipulates that, unless a different agreement is reached between the 
legal claimant and the current user of the property, a legally binding rental relation- 
ship arises on the day of restitution of the property. This clause gives the current 
user the right to rent the land at officially set prices. So as not to interfere with the 
agricultural use of land, any cancellation of this rental agreement must be an- 
nounced no later than 1 October of a given year for a transfer to be effected in the 
following year. This clause extends omewhat the reprivatization of land used by 
cooperatives and state farms. 
The focus of the restitution program is on individual citizens, while institutions 
are generally excluded from its purview. The Catholic Church is a major exception. 
Unlike the property of major firms in industry and banking, which was nationalized 
before the Communist takeover in 1948, much of the property of the Church was 
expropriated in the 1950s. This resulted in an exception granted to the Church in 
law no. 298/1990 dealing with 'Regulations of Property Rights of Religious Orders 
and Archdiocese of Olomouc'. By May 1993, 74 items of real estate were returned 
under this law to the Church. Further estitutions are debated by the Parliaments, 
where the major issue is whether to establish a rule for the type of property that can 
be claimed or whether to list specific properties which will be returned to the 
Church and exclude all else. In the meantime, the former property of the Church is 
blocked to other forms of privatization. 
Minor by the amount of property in question, but major from the moral point of 
view is the issue of Jewish property confiscated by the Germans in World War II 
and never eturned after 1945. Restitution of this property would go against he rule 
that restitutions should apply only to property confiscated by the Communist gov- 
ernment in or after 1948. It would hence provide a precedent for the return of 
property to other owners whose property was expropriated before the Communist 
era. As a result, no law on restitution of this property has been accepted so far. 
2.2. Practical Aspects of Restitutions 
Unlike the small and large scale privatization programs, the implementation f 
restitutions i to be resolved between the previous and present owners, without any 
direct role of the central authorities. The Czech and Slovak governments herefore 
do not even possess accurate data on the extent of effected restitutions. The esti- 
mates released by the Czech government cover the period to the end of 1992. Ac- 
cording to these estimates, about 30,000 items (mostly industrial enterprises) have 
been returned from nationalizations carried out between 1948 and 1955, and ap- 
proximately 70,000 items (mostly apartment buildings) have been returned from the 
property that was nationalized between 1955 and 1959. 
The restitution of enterprises on the basis of the law on Out-of-Court Rehabili- 
tations have had an impact on large scale privatization discussed later. The 
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previous owners, having the right to claim a part of present enterprise, can enter 
into negotiations with the management, other interested buyers or authors of 
privatization projects, or they can submit heir own privatization project. They can 
receive a share of the enterprise on the basis of their restitution claim and they can 
also buy another part or the rest of the enterprise. The official policy was that in 
these cases the restitution claimants can be given a priority over outsiders. For 
instance, they can buy the property for its estimated price (based on book value) and 
need not compete for the property in public auctions. 
Agricultural property has turned out to be the most problematic item in the res- 
titution program. The l gal requirement to register land transactions was discontin- 
ued in 1951 and evidence on land property is therefore incomplete and inaccurate. 8 
According to recent official estimates, 200,000 claims to restitution of agricultural 
property were submitted in the Czech Republic alone, but as of March 1993 only 
one-third of these claims was settled. Yet, the resolved claims have been substantial 
as about one-half of state-owned forests and agricultural and (used mostly by 
cooperatives) has already been returned. 
Table 3- NUMBER OF RESTITUTIONS AND OTHER FORMS OF PRIVATIZATION 
OF RETAIL TRADE COOPERATIVES 
Restituted Leased Sold Total Avail- 
able 
Total 
-CR 5 214 2 216 3 767 24 146 
-SR 135 358 44 11 861 
Remilshops 
- CR 1 936 1 287 2 101 16 399 
-SR 70 108 30 8 158 
Restaurants 
- CR 3 278 929 1 666 7 747 
- SR 65 250 14 3 703 
Source: Tydenik Hospodarskych novin 27/1991. The total number of units is recorded as of 31 December 
1990. The other data refer to 31 March 1991 in the Slovak Republic and 4 April 1991 in the Czech Republic. 
Restitutions according to law no. 403 continued until 2 Mayand in certain cases until 31 August 1991. Law 
no. 87/1991 was approved later and resulted in many additional new entitled claims. 
An important source of information about restitutions are r ports by owners of 
nationalized property who had to return their property to previous owners. Table 3 
contains information about the impact of restitutions on retail trade cooperatives. 
As can be seen from this table, although the deadline for submitting restitution 
claims based on the first restitution law was 2 May 1991, many restitutions were 
carried out well before this deadline. In interpreting the data in Table 3, one must 
also remember that cooperative restaurants d retail shops were dominant in rural 
areas but quite rare in the cities. The data hence indicate that within the first ten 
months of the privatization program, most restaurants in the Czech countryside 
were privatized, with restitutions accounting for more than one-half of the privat- 
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ized units. In contrast, privatization of retail shops proceeded slower and restitu- 
tions were less important. There is a historical reason for this asymmetry as many 
retail shops had been owned by coops before the forced 'collectivization'. Rather 
than nationalizing, the communist regime created highly centralized coops by 
combining both private shopkeepers and the independent coops. Finally, one can 
see from Table 3 that restitutions as well as other forms of privatization of coop- 
erative restaurants and retail shops proceeded much more slowly in Slovakia than 
in the Czech lands. 
2.3. An Assessment ofthe Restitution Program 
Restitution was intended to be a relatively less important privatization program 
than small and large scale privatization and there were fears that its 
implementation would hinder the other two programs. As it turned out, in the first 
two post-revolutionary years restitution played a much more important part than 
was ever expected. In privatizing the small business ector, for instance, restitutions 
dominated the sales of state property that were carried out within the small scale 
privatization program. The fears that restitutions would block privatization also 
proved only partially justified. The limitation of restitutions to property nationalized 
after February 1948 left a large part of state property to be privatized by other 
methods, while the amount returned was large enough to have a significant impact 
on the development of the private sector before the other privatization programs 
were started. Recent official estimates of the relative size of the returned property 
range from 10% to 25% of all state-owned apartment buildings and retail shops. 
Restitutions based on the law on Out-of-Court Rehabilitations have also covered 
significant assets in industry and they have had a strong impact on large scale 
privatization. Previous owners have submitted 397 separate privatization projects in 
the first wave of large scale privatization, which in turn involved over 2,800 enter- 
prises. 
Needless to say, decisions as to whether properties ought to be returned or pri- 
vatized through other means were not always clear and clean. The best known prob- 
lematic case was the disputed sale of the state-owned enterprise Rakona to Procter 
& Gamble. This factory was nationalized in 1946 by the democratic government, 
but the former owners filed a suit, disputing the legality of the nationalization de- 
cision. The case was unfinished at the time of the 1948 communist takeover and the 
communist authorities imply reconfirmed the 1946 nationalization decision. The 
heirs of the pre-1948 owners reopened the case after the 1989 revolution, claiming 
that the 1946 appeal was not resolved and that the communist government hence 
nationalized the company after 1948. If this interpretation were to be found correct, 
the heirs would have a possible restitution claim. The Czech Ministry of Pri- 
vatization rejected this interpretation, however, and sold Rakona to Procter & 
Gamble on the assumption that the 1946 nationalization decision was valid and no 
restitution claim was thus possible. The heirs have challenged this decision and at 
the time of the writing of this paper their appeal is with the court. In spite of the 
court's decision in favour of the state, the dispute is not likely to be resolved earlier 
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than next year. 
Another problematic area is that of restitutions in agriculture. As we already 
mentioned, proper documentation is often unavailable and the validity of restitution 
claims thus tend to be unclear. Unlike in housing, retail trade or catering, where 
restitutions have contributed to a fast start of the privatization process, in agricul- 
ture they have tended to slow down the process of restructuring cooperatives and 
privatizing state-owned land. 
Overall, despite the various problems that have arisen in the course of restitu- 
tions, the evidence is overwhelming that restitutions have provided a great initial 
boost to the privatization program and succeeded in privatizing an unexpectedly 
large part of nationalized property. They have been also highly complementary to 
the other parts of the overall privatization program. 
3. Small Scale Privatization 
Small scale privatization is the Czech and Slovak counterpart of Hungarian pre- 
privatization. 9 Its introduction i Czechoslovakia asa separate part of the privatiza- 
tion process was motivated by two factors. The first one was technical, namely that 
the preparation of a legislative, financial and institutional framework for large scale 
privatization required time. The time requirement was seen as substantial for both 
voucher schemes and Treuhand-like privatizations. The auctioning of retail shops 
and small businesses was hence viewed as a feasible and rapid way to launch the 
privatization process. 
Table 4 - ATYITUDES TOWARDS PRIVATIZATION (in % of each group) 
Group of Respondents No or Small No 
individual Firms Limits 
Total 
Residents of the Czech Republic 
Residents of the Slovak Republic 
Voting preference: Civic Forum, PAV 
Voting preference: Communist P_~Z 
18.6 46.5 34.9 
15.9 47.7 36.4 
23.5 44.4 32.1 
10.7 46.4 42.9 
45.5 44.9 9.6 
Note: 
No or individual: Either no private enterprises should be allowed, or they should be restricted to self-em- 
ployed individuals only. 
Small finns: Agree with private firms of small size, ranging from several to a maximum of 50 employees. 
No limits: Private nterprises ofany size should be allowed. 
Source: AISA. 
The second reason for launching small scale privatization was political. In the 
immediate post-revolutionary period, privatization of a major part of the economy 
was a controversial issue. The communist party was still powerful in the govern- 
ment and had almost a naajority in the parliament until the first free elections in 
June of 1990. However, the privatization of retail shops, small services, restaurants 
and the rest of small businesses was acceptable even to the communist party and 
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most of its electorate. As can be seen from Table 4, this support was not over- 
whelming, however, since in January 1990 over 45% of communist party voters 
were in fact against any private ownership other than self-employed individuals. 10 
3.1. The Legal Framework for Small Scale Privatization 
Small scale privatization was officially launched by the federal law on the 
Transfers of State Ownership of Certain Goods to Other Legal or Physical Persons 
(no. 427/1990), 11 passed on 25 October 1990. The law permits the sale or leasing of 
real and movable property possessed by state-owned enterprises and federal, re- 
publican and local governments. To be eligible for privatization under this law, the 
property must be a 'business unit', defined in the law as properties which 'form or 
may form sets which are complete conomic and property units'. The law stipulates 
three additional pre-conditions for a property to be admissible to small scale pri- 
vatization: 
- the right of use of the property is not leased or transferred toforeigners; 
- the unit is not in agricultural production; and 
- the property is not subject o restitution. 
In those cases where the business unit (for example, a shop) is privatized with- 
out property rights to the building and land on which it operates, a two-year lease is 
guaranteed by the state (e.g. if the building is acquired by a new owner, this owner 
is obliged tO honour the old lease for its legally fixed period of time). 12 
In spite of the term 'small' privatization, there are no legal limits on the size of 
the property to be privatized in this program. Some of the sales carried out within 
small privatization were in fact quite large (e.g. the Urpin Brewery in central Slo- 
vakia was sold for Kcs 320 million, or about US$10.8 million). 
In small privatization, property may be transferred only to 'natural' (individual) 
persons who are or were citizens of Czechoslovakia after 25 February 1948 and who 
are permanent residents of the Czech or Slovak republic. 13 Companies formed by 
such persons are also eligible but other (especially state-owned) enterprises are not. 
The only permissible method of privatization under this law is public auction. If 
a business unit fails to be sold in a public auction, another auction is organized and 
foreigners may participate. Persons wishing to join an auction are required to pay 
an entry fee of Kcs 1,000 (about US$35). In order to bid for an item, one must make 
an auction (escrow) deposit equal to 10% of the item's starting auction price. 
Auctions are conducted by District or City Privatization Committees) 4 whose 
members are nominated by the Ministries of Privatization of the Czech and Slovak 
republics. To ensure that information is publicly available, the list of objects that 
are to be auctioned must be published 30 days before the auction. The list must 
contain a description of each unit, its location, present owner, book value, and 
conditions under which interested persons can inspect he unit. Inventory of items 
in the unit' s stores (the value of which is not included in the unit' s auction price) as 
well as the extent and terms of credit on these items must also be listed. 
The present owner-custodian of a unit that is to be privatized must submit a 
'privatization sheet', containing all the information required by law. These owners 
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(mostly state or municipally-owned nterprises or cooperatives) play for the most 
part a passive role. Their only tool to hinder privatizafion is a late submission of the 
privatization sheet. The privatization committees, on the other hand, are rather 
powerful: if anyone, through the privatization committee, requests the auctioning of 
a part of any enterprise which is subject o the law on small privatization, the enter- 
prise is legally obliged to give the business unit up for auction or provide an expla- 
nation as to why this is impossible. Each privatization sheet is then submitted 
through the branch ministry to the Ministry of Privatization of the republic, which 
issues a permit for the auctioning of the unit. 
The organization of auctions has been centralized in order to prevent legal diffi- 
culties, which could be caused by wildcat auctioning of properties. In practice, 
many legal problems have arisen despite the centralized organization. 15 All 
auctions are of the English style, with the price rising in the presence of two or 
more bids. If no one expresses interest in purchasing a unit at the starting price, a 
Dutch auction is allowed under certain conditions. In this auction the auctioneer 
announces a starting price and continuously reduces it until someone accepts. 
Several restrictions have been imposed on the use of the Dutch auction: there must 
be at least five potential buyers present, the price cannot fall below 50% of the 
starting price (unless it is a repeated auction), and since October 1991 buildings and 
land have been excluded from Dutch auctions. The resulting price must be paid by 
the successful bidder within 30 days of the auction: the payment for the auctioned 
property goes to the Fund of National Property, the payment for the value of the 
inventories (if purchased as well) goes to the previous owner. If the buyer fails to 
pay on time, the purchase is void. 16 
Small scale privatization also has certain unusual egal features. For instance, 
no liabilities, such as labor contracts, debts (except hose for the inventory) and 
other obligations (except the obligation to continue selling food in the case this was 
the original line of business) are transferable with the property. They remain with 
the previous owner, i.e., mostly state-owned enterprises. 
3.2. Small Scale Privatization in Action 
The first auctions were held on 26 January I991 in Prague. The first auctions in 
the Slovak Republic took place one month later, on 24 February in Bratislava. In 
the Czech republic, small scale privatization had been finished at the end of 1993. 
Even earlier, in second half of 1992, it had lost its importance in favour of large 
scale privatization. In comparison with several thousands of units sold every quarter 
in 1991 and early 1992, in late 1992 only around one thousand were auctioned. 
Within the first six months of I993, small privatization amounted to only 646 units 
in whole Czech republic. The end of small scale privatization i the Slovak republic 
has not yet been announced. 
As can be seen from Table 5, most of the auctions took place in 1991 and early 
1992. Small scale privatization thus effectively preceded large scale privatization 
which gained momentum in 1992. The table also captures the dynamics of the 
small privatization process. Approved units are those which were proposed for 
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privatization and approved by the Ministry of Privatization. Since the 
implementation f privatization after the official approval is usually a lengthy 
process, at any point in time the number of actually privatized units is much smaller 
than the number of approved units. Person(s) who lease a unit that is to be 
privatized before a set deadline have a priority right to purchase the unit. Some 
units were hence sold rather than auctioned. 
An important criticism of small scale privatization stressed that it consisted 
primarily of selling leases instead of selling real property. As can be seen from 
Table 5, this was indeed the case at the start of the process. However, the proportion 
of units sold as real property (i.e. with land) was growing monotonically over time 
and in the second half of 1992 almost 50% of all sales were with land. Given the 
currently elevated land prices, it is not surprising that most proceeds from small 
scale privatization came from the sales of units that included real property. 
The course of small scale privatization i  Slovakia showed a similar pattern to 
that in the Czech republic - a rapid acceleration i the second half of 1991 and de- 
celeration during 1992. Slovakia also experienced a somewhat greater lag in im- 
plementation asonly 11,424 units were actually privatized by 30 October 1992. Of 
these, 9,306 were privatized through auctions, with the total value based on the 
starting price being Kcs 12.1 billion and value based on the final price being Kcs 
14.2 billion. 
3.3. What has Small Scale Privatization Achieved? 
Like restitution, small scale privatization played an important role in privatizing 
the Czechoslovak economy. Tens of thousands of units were sold within the pro- 
gram of small scale privatization (see Table 5), thus contributing significantly to 
the overall goal of the privatization program. 
Given that its implementation was based on auctions, small scale privatization 
could hardly have become the main tool of the entire privatization process. Since 
the goal of privatization was to distribute property primarily to Czechoslovak citi- 
zens, public auctions could not have served effectively as tools for privatizing large 
industrial enterprises. As it was administered, small privatization required bidders 
to commit significant financial resources, an aspect hat was often criticized for 
preventing new entrepreneurs from participating in the program. Since many bid- 
ders significantly leveraged their positions, the program was also criticized for en- 
dangering the future of the sector by exposing it to unnecessarily high frequency of 
bankruptcies. Finally, a critical imitation of small scale privatization was that the 
law restricted purchases solely to physical property, excluding most other assets and 
liabilities. 
The first of these criticisms was partly offset by the relatively liberal credit 
posture adopted by the major banking institutions. Credit was especially earmarked 












160 Moct-Most, N. 2, 1994 
it was increasing rapidly since early 1991. However, interest rates (relative to most 
other costs of production) were high and the financial burden of credit was thus 
heavy. 17 
A major advantage of small scale privatization was its simplicity, speed and 
countrywide coverage, which provided a signal to the general public that the gov- 
ernment was serious about privatization. Together with restitutions, mall privatiza- 
tion succeeded in privatizing the bulk of retail distributorships, catering and other 
services. It re-established the middle class of small entrepreneurs that was com- 
pletely wiped out by the communist regime. Finally, although a significant share of 
the government revenue came from transactions based on bank loans extended to 
the buyers, small privatization had a significant contribution to public finances, 
amounting to Kcs 31.6 billion in the Czech republic and more than Kcs 14 billion 
in the Slovak republic during the 1991-1992 period. 
4. Large Scale Privatization 
4.1. The Debate and Proposals 
The discussion about the merits and modalities of large scale privatization 
started soon after the collapse of the communist regime. In the first months there 
were several competing roups of proposals discussed in the government and the 
public. The most widely debated ones were the following: 
1. At least in the short term restrict privatization to smaller units. Commercialize 
large enterprises by separating their budget and management from the state and 
place emphasis on improvements in management. Privatization is to be based 
on the firm's business plan and should use standard (Treuhand-like) methods 
of privatization: direct sales, creation of joint ventures, leasing and so on; 
2. With the exception of small businesses, transfer the property rights over firms 
to employees. This could be done in a 'big bang' form by declaring the firms to 
be worker-owned, or gradually by introducing some form of employee stock 
ownership lans - ESOPs. 
3. Distribute the property for free or for a negligible fee to citizens at largeJ 8 The 
primary goal is the speed of privatization and its social acceptability (equity). 
Management and restructuring problems will be tackled by the new owners. 
Prevent spontaneous privatization (free takeover of firms by management) for 
reasons of equity and social acceptability. 
4.1.1. Proposals Emphasizing Commercialization a d Limited Privatization 
Proposals belonging to the first category were plentiful and had supporters both 
within the first non-communist government and among the managers of state- 
owned enterprises. 19The most prominent proposals of this type were the following: 
l(a). A proposal prepared in an internal document by a group of experts for the 
government ofCzech Republic. This proposal placed emphasis on separating 
enterprises from the state budget and creating a powerful governmental 
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agency for administering national property. Privatization was to be consid- 
ered a long term process, lasting several years or even decades; 
l(b). A proposal submitted by a group of experts of the Czechoslovak Deputy 
Prime Minister, Valtr Komarek. 2° This proposal was in many respects 
similar to the first one but it adopted a more tolerant attitude toward 
spontaneous privatization. 21 The law on State-Owned Enterprise (no. 
111/1990) of April 1990 was drafted by this team and it permitted the 
transfer of property of state-owned companies to other companies, without 
imposing strict conditions. In practice, this paved a way for the possibility of 
transferring state property to the management. As a result, this provision of 
the law was later abolished; 
l(c). A proposal of the Union of Industry, a forceful pressure group of the top 
management of state-owned enterprises. 22 The core of this proposal was 
based on similar ideas as the two previous ones but it added two features fa- 
voring current management and employees: 
- the agency for administration of state-owned enterprises should at least 
partly be controlled by deputies of firms and employees; and 
- each firm should be privatized according to the decision of the firm's 
management and the revenue gained from privatization should serve as 
a source of income for the firm; 
l(d). A proposal to rely on leasing as the main tool of privatization. This proposal 
has been repeatedly but always unsuccessfully submitted by some members of 
the Parliament. 
4.1.2. Proposals Emphasizing Worker Ownership 
Proposals falling within the second (worker participation and ownership) cate- 
gory enjoyed historical prominence in Czechoslovakia. The 1968 economic reform, 
interrupted by the Soviet tanks, contained a spontaneous element of employee 
control. The cooperative movement also had long historic traditions in the country. 
After the 1989 revolution, these proposals were backed by a number of political 
parties and other groups: 
2(a). Labor-management played a significant role in the Social Democratic Party's 
election program in both the 1990 and 1992 elections, ESOPs were an im- 
portant element in the 1992 program of the 'Liberal Social Union' and partly 
in the program of the Communist party; 
2(b). Employee ownership was extensively discussed in the (religiously oriented) 
Czechoslovak Peoples Party in 1990; 
2(c). Employee ownership was also advocated by Ota Sik, a prominent economist 
active in the 1968 reform [see e.g., Sik O. (ed.), 1990]; 
2(d). Self-Management was the main theme of the Movement for Self-managed 
Society, whose proposals were based on ideas from the large literature on 
self-management and directly inspired by Jaroslav Vanek, a leading re- 
searcher and propagator f these ideas [see e.g., Vanek J., 1990]; 
2(e). Until mid-1990, ESOP plans were discussed within government and em- 
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ployee ownership was listed as one of the privatization methods in some of 
the early 1990 government documents. After the June 1990 election victory of 
the Civic Forum, a movement broadly oriented toward introducing a market 
economy, the ESOP and labor-management proposals lost part of their 
support as private property-based reforms gained greater popular appeal. The 
law on State Owned Enterprise ven removed some institutions of labor man- 
agement which were introduced within the communist government's attempt 
at economic reform in the 1980s. 
4.1.3. Proposals Stressing the Distribution of Property to Citizens at Large 
Proposals for mass privatization started gaining support from early 1990. The 
first of them, prepared by Svejnar (1989), appeared in the Czechoslovak context as 
early as December 1989-January 1990. The following strategies of distribution of 
companies' hares were discussed in Czechoslovakia: 
3(a). Transform state-owned nterprises into joint stock companies and distribute a
significant portion of their shares to citizens at large in the form of diver- 
sified portfolios. To make the distribution manageable, prepare partially di- 
versified portfolios of enterprise shares in the form of (private or public) 
mutual funds and give each citizen a portfolio of shares of these funds into a 
computerized account. This allocation can be made virtually instantaneously, 
is equitable and does not require pricing of shares. It minimizes the exposure 
of individuals to risk and provides new entrepreneurs with a stock of wealth 
that can be used as a collateral for loans. Remaining shares can be distributed 
to pension and health insurance companies, as well as to local government or
other entities. Voluntary trading of enterprise and mutual fund shares could 
start immediately after the computerized distribution and it would lead to a 
market-based determination f share prices [Svejnar J., 1989]. 
Similar proposals were (and still are) discussed in Poland [see e.g., Lipton D. 
and J. Sachs, 1990 or Frydman R., Rapaczynski A. and J.S. Earle, 1993]. 
3(b). Distribute shares of individual enterprises to individuals through holding 
companies, o that each firm would be controlled by one of these companies 
[see Blanchard O. et al., 1991]. 
3(c). Issue free or almost free vouchers to individuals, entitling them to bid for 
shares of any firm slated for privatization. This method needs to determine 
share prices and tends to be iterative in nature. It leaves the bidding decisions 
to the citizens who choose to participate in the program and the price ad-  
justment decisions to the government. I  is time consuming and exposes the 
participating individuals to all the undiversified risk as well as the benefits of 
learning-by-doing. 
4.1.4. The Adopted Program 
The adopted program of large scale privatization has been quite flexible in 
terms of the permitted privatization methods. The program allows direct sales, 
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auctions, transformations into a joint stock company and sale or voucher 
distribution of shares, or a combination of the various methods. Within the voucher 
scheme citizens can either allocate their vouchers into mutual funds or bid with 
their vouchers for shares of specific enterprises. Privatization projects may also 
propose that up to 10% of enterprise shares be sold to workers in the firm. 
Unlike in the plans discussed in Poland, mutual funds are established 
voluntarily by private or government-owned organizations (for example, banks) on 
the basis of their own decision to run such a fund. On the other hand, flexibility in 
the use of vouchers does not go as far as in the Russian case - vouchers are issued 
separately for each one of the two waves of large scale privatization and they' cannot 
be used for any other purchases (for example, for purchases of property in small 
scale privatization). 
4.2. The Legal Framework for Large Scale Privatization 
The legal base for large scale privatization consists of several laws and a 
number of administrative regulations. The federal law on Conditions for 
Transferring State Property to Other Persons (no. 92/1991), 23 passed on 26 
February 1991 and became ffective in April 1991. It gives basic guidelines for the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, banks, insurance companies and other 
institutions. The law also covers the privatization of shares and other property 
assets owned by the state or the above institutions in other enterprises (for example, 
the Czechoslovak government's property share in joint ventures). Unlike in 
restitution, new owners can be both domestic or foreign entities. Unlike in small 
scale privatization, the privatized property includes all assets, liabilities and claims 
towards the enterprise as well as all contracts. Wage and other agreements hence 
stay with the enterprise through privatization. The only exceptions relate to 
property falling within natural restitution, property privatized in small privatization 
and areas where the law requires tate ownership. 
Large scale privatization may be carried out through one (or a combination) of 
five permissible privatization methods: 
- transformation of a state-owned enterprise into a joint stock company and a 
transfer of shares (e.g., through voucher privatization); 
- direct sale to a predetermined buyer; 
- public auction or public tender; 
- flee (of charge) transfer to municipal ownership; and 
- flee (of charge) transfer to social security, health insurance and other publicly 
beneficial institutions. 
Transformation of a state-owned enterprise into joint-stock company is quite 
differentiated; shares may be distributed through voucher privatization to citizens, 
sold directly to a domestic or foreign owner, sold through intermediary (stock ex- 
change, over-the-counter RM system or other financial institution), transferred for 
free to municipalities, health insurance companies, sold to employees or issued to 
former owners as compensation f their restitution claims. Moreover, a part of the 
shares are kept temporarily or permanently by the Fund of National Property. 
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Whereas the former ownership of FNM usually indicates that negotiations with 
foreign or partner are in progress and shares will be sold after agreement is
reached, permanent ownership is intended to preserve state influence on key enter- 
prises. This may be achieved even with low number of shares held by FNM, since 
Czech law recently introduced the institute of a golden share. Approval of its owner 
is needed for certain key decisions, specified in company's status. 
Privatization of each enterprise is based on an officially accepted privatization 
project. According to the law, all state-owned enterprises must be classified as 
either being slated for the first or second wave of large scale privatization or as 
being temporarily exempt from privatization. 24 Each enterprise selected by the 
government for privatization i  one of the two privatization waves is required to 
submit a basic privatization project (proposal). The responsibility for preparing the 
project lies with the founding institution (usually a ministry). However, the project 
is usually designed by enterprise management. 
Any local or foreign institution or individual can present a competing project 
which, if it meets certain requirements, will be considered on an equal footing with 
the basic project by all authorities involved in the privatization process. The found- 
ing ministry evaluates all the submitted projects that fall under its jurisdiction and 
passes its evaluation for the final decision to the republican Ministry of Privatiza- 
tion. 25 In some cases (for example, when a foreign entity directly buys the enter- 
prise), the decision is taken by the republican government rather than by the Minis- 
try of Privatization. 
The privatization projects must describe the proposed organization of the privat- 
ized enterprise and the proposed method of privatization. Projects also have to con- 
tain information about he enterprise's recent history: for projects ubmitted in the 
first wave this information related to employment, wages, capital, sales, costs, 
profit, and foreign trade during the 1989-1991 period. 26 In order to enable the pro- 
posers of competing projects to obtain and furnish the necessary information, man- 
agers are required to provide the relevant information upon request. 
The transaction price of an enterprise varies with the method of privatization 
and the status of the potential buyer. The book value of the firm has to be stated in 
all projects and a copy of the balance sheet of the enterprise must be attached to 
each proposal. Land and other eal assets must be priced according to valid pricing 
regulations, 27resulting in prices which in most cases differ significantly from the 
corresponding book values. For public auctions, tenders or direct sales to domestic 
buyers, the book value is taken as the basis for the starting or sale price. In the case 
of transformations of state enterprises into joint stock companies, the book value 
determines the book value of equity. Foreign buyers must also submit a price esti- 
mate based on an audit by an independent accountant, which is then subject o fur- 
ther negotiations. The lawmakers intended this provision as an advantage for local 
buyers; in practice the book value is often dubious and both domestic and foreign 
buyers tend to use price estimates by auditing firms when approaching direct sales. 
After the privatization project has been approved, the property of the state- 
owned enterprise is transferred tothe republican Fund of National Property. 28 This 
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transfer legally amounts to a dissolution of the firm (without being formally liqui- 
dated by the founding ministry) and founding of a new firm by the Fund. The Fund 
then sells or transfers the property by method(s) proposed by the approved project. 
In the case of some joint stock companies privatized in the first wave, the approved 
privatization projects tipulated that the Fund would retain part of the property. The 
Fund's assets and their yields are separate form the government budget. 
4.3. Large Scale Privatization: Scope and Results 
Large scale privatization covers most state-owned assets in industry, agriculture 
and trade. Using data from the Czech Republic for illustration, the 1990 official 
book value of all capital in the Czech Republic was Kcs 2,604 billion (about US$95 
billion). In comparison, the book value of enterprises for which at least one privati- 
zation project was submitted by March 1992 was more than Kcs 1,000 billion. In 
Table 6 we show the number of enterprises slated for privatization and the fraction 
that entered the first wave which took place in 1992. As can be seen from the table, 
over one-half of the eligible firms entered the first wave. 
Table 6- FIRST WAVE OF PRIVATIZATION: ENTERPRISE DATA BY REPUBLICS 
(number of State Enterprises) 
CR SR CSFR 
Eligible for Privatization 4,400 1,600 6,000 
Entering First Wave 2,210 900 3,100 
Offered in Voucher Scheme 988 593 1,491 
Note: The fist two rows are based on 1991 government s imates. All numbers efer to the situation i 1991. 
Since then, many state-owned nterprises have been divided and the present umber of enterprises is much 
higher. The third row gives numbers of enterprises with headquarters in each republic. Of the 988 firms 
located in the Czech Republic, for instance, 45 were founded by federal organizations. Hence only 943 
submitted privatization projects o the Ministry of Privatization fthe Czech Republic. 
The first steps leading to large scale privatization were carried out in 1991 since 
the relevant law dates to 1 April 1991. However, the entire process of privatizing a
firm (including the preparation of the project, processing by founding ministries, 
approval by the privatization authority, and finally the transfer of the property to a 
new owner) turns out to be very lengthy. 
First, the list of enterprises to be privatized was compiled by the founding min- 
istries and approved by the government. This list, published in June 1991, divided 
all firms into the following categories: finns to be privatized in first or second wave 
of privatization, firms to be privatized later (after more than five years) and firms to 
be liquidated. Projects for the first wave had to be submitted by 31 October 1991 but 
the deadline was extended for competing (non-management) projects until 20 
January 1992, when the approval process tarted. Projects for the second wave had 
to be submitted by 16 July 1992 with the exception of firms in a health related 
industry. 
Within this timetable, it took nearly a year before the process generated results. 
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For instance, only 27 projects were approved in the Czech republic in 1991. Of 
these, 20 resulted in the transfer of property in the same year (5 firms were sold in 
auctions, 2 were sold in public competitions, 5 were sold directly, and 8 cases in- 
volved the sale of shares of a state-owned joint stock company). Yet, the massive 
work undertaken i 1991 resulted in a breakthrough in 1992. As can be seen from 
Table 7, almost 4,000 privatization projects were approved in the Czech Republic 
alone in 1992. Needless to say, the implementation f privatization by the Funds of 
National Property lagged somewhat behind the approvals. On 31 December 1992, 
for instance, 36% of approved projects were implemented, with another 24% of 
projects being realized through the voucher privatization scheme discussed below. 
The resulting property transfer took place on 29 March 1993 in Slovakia and on 24 
May 1993 in the Czech republic. 
Table 7 - PROGRESS OF LARGE SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN 1992 IN THE CZECH 
REPUBLIC: APPROVED PRIVATIZATION PROJECTS*, 1991-1993 
(cumulative number) 
Privatization method 1991 1992 1993 
I-IV I-II I-IV I-II 
Public Auction 
- number of firms 5 218 336 431 
- value of property ^ n.a. 2 650 3,881 5,634 
Public Tender 
- number of firms 2 147 300 424 
- value of property ^ n.a. 5 953 10,436 16,434 
Direct Sale 
- number of firms 5 524 986 1 359 
- value of property n.a. 14 077 26 613 38 016 
Privatization Joint Stock Company 
- number of firms 8 1,120 1 218 1 327 
- value of property ^ n.a. 380 001 420 171 534 779 
Unpa id  transfer 
- number of firms 0 786 1 052 1 352 
- value of property ^ n.a. 7 395 9 633 12 772 
Total 
- number of firms 20 2 795 3 900 4 893 
- value of property ^ n.a. 432 318 470 734 607 635 
* Former federal property is not included. 
^ million Kcs 
Source: Ministry for Privadzation of the Czech Republic. 
As can be seen from Table 7, the single most frequently approved method of 
privatization was the privatization of joint stock companies. Voucher privatization 
was in turn the most frequently used method within this category. The other most 
important methods of privatization were direct sales, public tenders and free (of 
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charge) transfers to municipalities and health, social insurance and other publicly 
beneficial organizations. Finally, public auctions also accounted for a number of 
privatization. 
After the approval rush in the second quarter of 1992, caused by the deadline set 
for the approval of projects for the first wave of voucher privatization, the privati- 
zation process lowed down and in the fourth quarter of 1992 it virtually stopped. 
While Kcs 366 billion worth of property was approved for privatization in the sec- 
ond ('voucher') quarter of 1992, Kcs 32 billion worth of property was approved in 
the third quarter, and only Kcs 6.4 billion in the fourth quarter. 
This slowdown was brought about by several factors. First, after the June 1992 
elections, a new administration came to power in both republics and at the federal 
level. Unlike in Slovalda, there was only a minor shift in the political composition 
of the government in the Czech Republic, but new Ministers of Privatization came 
to office in both republics. Probably more significant was the fact that the least 
problematic projects were easily approved first, with the more difficult ones re- 
maining to be resolved later. As can be seen from the Czech republic data in Table 
8, most of the first wave projects were either approved or rejected by 30 October 
1993. However, for 102 firms (out of 2,431) all projects were rejected and whole 
process of submitting and approving has to start again. Moreover, nearly 400 firms 
were still waiting for a decision. Among the second wave projects, only one third 
was decided in October; the speed of the approval process had been accelerated just 
around that date, since the supply of firms for the second wave of voucher privati- 
zation has to be finalized by February 1994. 
The slowdown was also caused in part by the publicity surrounding first privati- 
zation scandals which appeared together with demands for the reversal of several 
decisions. 29 Finally, although legislators expected privatization decisions to be 
simple, with only one privatization project being frequently submitted for a given 
firm, 11,315 projects were in fact submitted for 2,431 firms in the first wave. For 
most firms the authorities had to select from a number of competing proposals, thus 
requiring significant time for the approval process. 
Table 8- NUMBER OF LARGE PR1VATIZATION PROJECTS AND PRIVATIZED 
ENTERPRISES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AS OF 31 MARCH 1993 
First wave Second wave 
Projects Firms Projects Finns 
Projects submitted 11 315 2 431 12 004 2 052 
Decision reached 10 121 2 032 4 924 913 
Projects approved 3 531 1 930 2 683 819 
Project rejected 6 590 102 2 241 94 
Undecided 1 194 399 7 080 1 139 
Source: Report of Ministry of Privatization f the Czech Republic. 
The fact that the approval of a privatization project often resulted in a break-up 
of a state-owned firm into several parts, with each being possibly privatized by a 
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different method, also explains the difference in the data between Tables 7 and 8. 
Table 8 gives the number of privatization projects and the number of firms entering 
large scale privatization. Table 7 shows how the various units resulting from ap- 
proved projects were going to be privatized. 
Another important feature of Czechoslovak privatization was its openness to- 
wards general public. As can be seen from Table 9, outside bidders submitted 39% 
of all privatization projects, followed by the management of the companies with 
25% of projects. In terms of success, it turns out that the management proposals 
were the most successful ones, resulting in a majority of the approved projects. 
Table 9 - PROPOSERS OF PROJECTS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC (31 December 1992) 
Project Submitted by Total number Percentage 
Management of Company 2 813 25 
Management ofPlants 450 4 
Bidders for Purchase of Company 4 388 39 
District Privatization Commission 788 7 
Restitution Claimants 450 4 
Local Government 450 4 
Consulting Firms 338 3 
Others 1 575 14 
Total 11 252 100 
Note: Bidders for the purchase of a company are proposers of competing projects who wish to purchase the 
company. 
Consulting firms submit projects proposing sales to other entities or apply to obtain a contract to organize a
tender or auction. 
5. Voucher Privatization 
The law on Large Scale Privatization (no. 92/1991) allows for the distribution of 
shares of joint stock companies to citizens through vouchers. Decree no. 383/1991 
of the federal government from 5 September 1991 defines the technical procedure 
of voucher privatization, describes how eligible individuals can obtain vouchers and 
sets guidelines for the functioning of Investment Privatization Funds (IPFs) - 
mutual funds to which the holders of vouchers can allocate their voucher points for 
investment. 
The process of voucher privatization fits into the two waves of large scale pri- 
vatization. Within each wave about one-half of the enterprises slated for voucher 
privatization are offered for privatization i  several rounds of bidding. The voucher 
scheme consists of a matching of bids by voucher holders with a fixed number of 
shares supplied by each enterprise. The authorities adjust share prices in terms of 
voucher points between individual rounds in an attempt to match the demand for 
shares with supply, thus hoping to sell many firms fast. 
Enterprises are selected for voucher privatization on the basis of privatization 
projects. In the first wave the privatization authorities set a rough goal in terms of 
how much book value of enterprise assets hould go into voucher privatization and 
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indicated to what extent hey would favour projects allocating a part of shares into 
the voucher scheme. In the process of preparing projects, many enterprise managers 
as well as others consulted with the founding and privatization ministries and 
adjusted the proportion of shares allocated for vouchers o as to increase their 
chances of approval. Hence, the voucher scheme was to some extent an iterative 
process already in the phase of project preparation. In the process of reviewing 
projects, privatization ministries ubmitted information to the Federal Ministry of 
Finance which was in charge of coordinating the voucher scheme. 
The demand side of voucher privatization is represented by individual investors 
and IPFs that use their voucher points to bid for the available shares. Since late 
1991, post offices all over Czechoslovakia had a supply of voucher books to be used 
in the first wave in 1992. Every Czechoslovak citizen over the age of 18 and 
residing permanently in Czechoslovakia could register one such book for a fee of 
Kcs 1,000 (approximately US$35 or one-third of the average monthly wage in 
Czechoslovakia atthe time). Upon registering, each citizen was entitled to bid for 
shares of enterprises that allocated shares to the voucher scheme in the first wave. 
Each voucher book, formally worth 1,000 investment points is divided into ten 100- 
point parts. Before the bidding process tarted (in the so-called zero round), indi- 
vidual participants could allocate the entirety or parts of their voucher books to one 
or several IPFs. The IPFs were required to provide basic information about them- 
selves and their investment s rategies. Individual investors also had access to back- 
ground information about the firms that entered the voucher scheme (including 
their profitability, indebtedness, sales, employment, and the extent o which a frac- 
tion of shares was being acquired by a domestic or foreign firm). 
The bidding for shares of enterprises was organized within several rounds. Be- 
fore each round the authorities would announce for each company its share price, 
the number of available (remaining) shares and the extent of excess demand regis- 
tered in the previous round. In the first round the price was set identically for all 
companies and it was adjusted individually for each enterprise thereafter. 
At the end of each round, the Center for Voucher Privatization at the Federal 
Ministry of Finance processed the bids as follows: 
a) If the demand for shares of a given company was equal or less than the supply 
of shares, all orders were met at the price set for that round. The authorities 
then reduced the share price for excess upply companies; 
b) If demand exceeded supply by less than 25% and the presence by the IPFs was 
significant, the demand of individual investors was met and the IPFs were ra- 
tioned proportionately to their bids. The presence of IPFs was deemed to be 
significant if their demand id not have to be reduced by more than 20%. In 
this case all shares were sold at the going price and were hence no longer 
available for bids in the following round; 
c) If demand exceeded supply and the conditions in b) above were not satisfied, no 
transaction took place (the points were returned to their owners) and the 
authorities raised the share price for the following round. 
According to the announcement of the Price Commission, prices were set ac- 
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cording to a complex algorithm, involving as many as 17 indicators. The algorithm 
was never revealed but econometric estimations of price-setting equations carried 
out by Svejnar and Singer (1993) and Hanousek and Lastovicka (1993) show that 
the price setting behavior of the authorities may be fit very precisely by a relatively 
simple estimating equation. The most important variables explaining the price set- 
ting behavior were the share price in the previous round and the excess of demand 
over supply of shares (both variables having positive coefficients) as well as the 
total supply of shares (entering the equation with a negative coefficient). Both 
studies also indicate that the estimated coefficients varied across rounds. It hence 
appears that the authorities used a relatively simple set of rules for setting prices 
and that the rules changed from round to round. Interestingly enough, the Svejnar 
and Singer (1993) study also shows that the coefficients of the price setting equa- 
tions differed significantly between the Czech and Slovak republics. 
The conduct and termination of the first wave of voucher privatization was left 
at the discretion of the Federal Ministry of Finance. The Ministry had the autonomy 
to decide on how to adjust prices, whether or not to take firms with significant ex- 
cess demand out of the process and when to declare a final round. Since all unused 
points became void, the uncertainty induced by the Ministry exerted a significant 
pressure on investors and the IPFs to bid so as to place their points. 
The Timetable of Voucher Privatization 
The timetable of voucher privatization is summarized in Table 10. As can be 
seen from the table, after about half a year of preparation the actual bidding for 
shares took place in five rounds from 18 May to 22 December 1992. Hence, the 
entire process lasted slightly more than a year, with the bidding part taking seven 
months. 
Until mid-May 1993, shares of Slovak enterprises were being transferred tonew 
owners but the Czech government made the distribution of shares of Czech 
enterprises contingent on the resolution of a Czech-Slovak dispute over the division 
of property and clearing of debts. However, on 13 May the Czech government 
announced that it would proceed with the distribution of shares of Czech enterprises 
to both the Czech and Slovak citizens on 24 May 1993. 
Privatization projects for the second wave (which has so far been taking place in 
the Czech Republic only) bad to be approved by the end of October 1993. Between 
October and early December 1993, citizens could registered their voucher books 
and as of 15 December 1993 they could assign their vouchers to Investment Pri- 
vatization Funds. Actual rounds of bidding were to start on 21 March 1994. As in 
the first round, the duration and number of rounds (as well as the termination of the 
process) is left at the discretion of the (Czech) Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 10 - TIMETABLE OF THE FIRST AND SECOND WAVES OF VOUCHER PRI- 
VATIZATION 
Privatization projects approved 
- first wave 
- second wave 
SOE for vouchers registered as JSC 
- first wave 
- second wave 
Vouchers to be registered by citizens 
- first wave 
- second wave 
Investment privatization funds registered 
- fast wave 
- second wave 
List of IPFs published 
- first wave 
- second wave 
List of Supplied Enterprises published 
- first wave 
- second wave 
First wave (1992) 
- zero round 
- first round 
- second round 
- third round 
- fourth round 
- fifth round 
Shares passed to citizens and IPFs 
Second wave (1993/4) - zero round 
Second wave (1994) - first round 
Start Bids until End of period _ 
31 April 1992 
29 October 1993 
11 May 1992 
1 December 1993 
1 November 
1 October 
17 February 1992 
15 November 1993 
28 February 1992 
End of November 
1993 








24 May 1993" 
15 December 1993 















* In the Slovak Republic, shares were issued on 29 March. 
5.1. Investment Privatization Funds ( I P Fs ) 
The law on Cond i t ions  of  T rans fer r ing  State Property to  Other  Persons (no. 
92/1991)  permi ts  the part ic ipat ion of  IPFs in voucher  pr ivat izat ion.  A l though the 
decree on the Issue and  Use of  Pr ivat izat ion Vouchers  (no. 383/91)  and  its amend-  
ment  (no. 62/1992)  f rom early 1992 have  establ ished certa in  regulat ions  for the 
operat ion  of  IPFs, a law regulat ing the IPFs ( law no. 248/1992 'On  Investment  Cor-  
porat ions  and  Investment  Funds ' )  was passed only on 28 Apr i l  1992 - two months  
after  the deadl ine for reg ister ing IPFs. Unt i l  then,  the found ing  of IPFs was gu ided 
by the law on Jo int  Stock Compan ies  (no. 104/1990),  or, after  31 December  1991, 
by the newly in t roduced Commerc ia l  Code (no. 513/1991).  Ne i ther  of these laws 
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addresses in detail the issue of investment companies. The laws hence do not im- 
pose any restrictions or regulations on their conduct. The screening of funds par- 
ticipating in the first wave of voucher privatization was therefore done only by the 
Privatization Ministries of the Czech and Slovak Republics, which had to approve 
each IPF's eligibility for participation i voucher privatization. 
The delay in passing the law on Investment Corporations had two negative f- 
fects on the first wave: the limited regulation and oversight of IPFs and the fact that 
the only permissible form of an IPF was a 'Legally Independent Joint Stock Com- 
pany' - a form which entails costly management and accounting. The 1992 Law on 
Investment Corporations and Investment Funds allowed this legal form as well as 
open or closed mutual funds with far easier and cheaper management. Both closed 
and open mutual funds have been widely used in the second wave, although the old 
form of IPFs still dominates. 
To establish an IPF, its founder must be a corporation with equity of at least Kcs 
1 million (about US$33,000) per fund. In applying to the relevant Ministry of Pri- 
vatization for approval, the founder must submit a proposal of the founder' s plan, a 
draft contract between the founder and the IPF (which is established as a separate 
corporation) concerning the conditions of control of the fund, and a draft of the 
statutes of the IPF. 
The founder's plan must contain: 
- the management conditions of the fund; 
- information on the number and qualification of the proposed administrators of
the fund; 
- information about the members of the board of directors and the supervisory 
board of the fund; 
- the fund's investment policy towards sectorai specialization and risk taking; 
and 
- certification that the equity of the fund would be Kcs 100,000 before the start of 
voucher privatization. 
The contract between the founder and the fund has to contain conditions of re- 
ward of the founder for managing the fund. This reward cannot exceed 2% of the 
nominal value of the shares gained in voucher privatization within the course of 
privatization and 3% of the property of the fund one year after the privatization. 
Finally, the most important regulatory clauses, introduced through amendments 
to the decree on the Issue of Vouchers, excluded top government officials from the 
boards of the IPFs and restricted each IPF from investing more than 10% of its 
points in a single company and obtaining more than 20% of shares of any company. 
IPFs established by a single founder were allowed to accumulate up to 40% of 
shares in a given company but this percentage was later reduced to 20%. However, 
the clause proved ineffective since IPFs can (and do) merge. Finally, a clause of law 
no. 248/1992 forbids IPFs founded by financial institutions from purchasing shares 
of financial institutions. This clause was aimed at preventing excessive concentra- 
tion of financial capital as shares of the largest commercial banks, insurance com- 
panies and saving and loans institutions were offered through the voucher scheme 
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in the first wave (see Table 11). 
Table 11 - MAJOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE FIRST WAVE 
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Book Vouchers Other FNP Restitution 
Institution* Value ^ (%) Investors (%) Fund (%) 
Commercial Bank 4.56 53 44 3 
Vseobec. Uverova Bank 2.04 52 45 3 
Czech Savings & Loan Bank 5.60 37 Free transfer to local 
governments (20%) 40 3 
Investment Bank 1.00 52 45 3 
Czech Insurance Company 1.64 15 S&L Investment Fund 3 
First Investment Fund 
CS. Trade Bank (77%) 
Interbank 
Employees (5%) 
* the first two institutions are the largest Czech and largest Slovak commercial banks. 
^ billions Kcs 
5.2. The Voucher Scheme at Work 
5.2.1. First wave 
On the supply side, a total of 1,491 enterprises offered some of their shares in 
the first wave of voucher privatization. Of these, 593 were Slovak and 988 Czech 
firms (Table 6). There were significant differences between the privatization pro- 
jects for voucher privatization in the two republics, as Slovak firms tended to rely 
more exclusively on voucher privatization than firms in the Czech republic. In par- 
ticular, only 39.7% of the Czech firms entering voucher privatization used vouchers 
as an exclusive method, while in Slovakia 90.1% of projects did so. Many Czech 
projects combined the voucher method with sales to domestic or foreign investors or 
with creating a joint venture. 3° Nevertheless, as can be seen from Table 12, many 
Czech projects actually allocated a high proportion of shares to voucher privatiza- 
tion. 3I 
Table 12- SHARE OF VOUCHERS PROJECTS APPROVED BY THE CZECH MINIS- 
TRY OF PRIVATIZATION, 31 APRIL 1991 
Share of Vouchers 1 - 25 26 - 50 51 - 75 76 - 100 
Number of Companies 16 96 176 660 
Source: The Ministry of Privatization of the Czech Republic. 
In some cases the Fund of National Property keeps part of the property. The 
reasons for this decision include the desire to preserve domestic majority owner- 
ship, influence the situation in important companies during negotiations with for- 
eign or domestic investors (e.g., in major banking institutions), and ensure the re- 
alization of joint venture agreements ( hares held by the Fund are transferred to the 
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foreign partner once he fulfils agreed upon conditions). Table 11 provides an illus- 
tration of this principle in the financial sector. Of course, the shares in Funds' 
holding can also be sold, auctioned, offered at the stock market or sold through in- 
termediaries. 
On the demand side, the developments in the first wave were rather dramatic. 
Between November 1991 and early January 1992, only several hundred thousand 
persons registered their voucher books. Government estimates at the time indicated 
that around 2.5 million inhabitants would register before the deadline, with the 
book value of voucher property per voucher book thus amounting to Kcs 70,000. 
The number of registered citizens actually reached 2.5 million in mid-January 
1992, just as several private and bank-sponsored IPFs started an aggressive cam- 
paign to induce citizens to register voucher books and deposit hem with the IPF. 
One of the private companies controlling several funds, Harvard Capital & Consult- 
ing, focused on undecided individuals by offering each person registering his/her 
vouchers with a Harvard IPF the option to sell his/her IPF shares to Harvard for Kcs 
10,035 (ten times the cost of registering vouchers) in one year. This strategy, copied 
by several other funds, 32 induced 8,566 million citizens (approximately 75% of all 
eligible individuals) to register before the end of February 1992. While greatly 
popularizing the voucher method, the stampede naturally reduced the value of 
assets per participant. In fact, the book value of assets per voucher book fell to Kcs 
35,000. 
In fact, 434 IPFs, of which 264 in the Czech and 170 in the Slovak Republic, 
were founded by various organizations and entered the zero round on 1 March 
1992. The most successful in attracting vouchers were funds connected with large 
financial institutions. Overall, 72% of voucher points were placed with IPFs, leav- 
ing only 28% for direct bidding by individual voucher investors. The overwhelming 
registration of points with the IPFs probably reflects both the desire of the citizens 
to diversify risk and the perceived guarantee of the funds to pay a multiple of the 
cost of the voucher points. 
As can be seen from Table 13, citizens of both republics tended to invest their 
points in their domestic IPFs, although Slovaks invested more in the Czech IPFs 
than vice versa. This tendency was seen even more clearly in the actual bidding for 
shares in the five rounds. Another significant feature - possibly a very important 
one for the future role of funds in the Czech and Slovak economies - is the ten- 
dency to place points into large, well known funds, instead of funds specializing in 
particular sectors or regions. Among the nine most successful IPFs, there was only 
one not connected with a major financial institution (Harvard Capital & 
Consulting) and only one founded by a foreign bank (Credit, affiliated with a major 
Austrian bank). Thirteen of the largest IPF founders controlled over 56% of all 
points given to the funds and, as can be seen from Table 14, the degree of 
concentration was high by other criteria s well. 
As mentioned earlier, the actual bidding for shares in the first wave of voucher 
privatization took place in five rounds. As can be seen from Table 15, a full 30% of 
shares allocated into voucher privatization were sold in the first round and 25.9% 
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cleared the market in round 2. By the time the fifth round was finished, about 92% 
of all shares were transacted. In terms of voucher points, the IPFs spent 99.7% of 
their voucher points, while individual investors placed 96.5% of their points. The 
participation of investors was also massive as over 88% of available points was 
placed in bids in every round. 
Table 13 - THE ZERO ROUND ALLOCATION OF VOUCHER POINTS (million points) 
Czech Republic Slovak Republic Total 
Obtained by citizens 5 980 2 580 8 560 
Given to IPFs 4 320 1 820 6 130 
- Czech IPFs 4 290 180 4 470 
- Slovak IPFs 30 1 630 1 660 
Table 14 - STRUCTURE OF IPFs BY SIZE (millions ofreceived points) 
< 1 1 - 5 5- 10 I0-  50 50- 100 > 100 
Number of IPFs 191 122 43 59 6 t 3 
The IPFs tended to use a larger percentage of their points and hence buy rela- 
tively more shares in earlier rounds than individual investors. This undoubtedly 
reflected in part the official pressure on the IPFs to participate massively in the 
scheme. It may have also reflected a strategy of the funds to obtain shares of spe- 
cific companies almost at any cost. Since the average share price declined after the 
second round (Table 15), individual investors on average purchased cheaper shares 
than the IPFs. 
As can be seen from Table 15, in any given round very few firms succeeded in
selling all of their shares. Most of them flipped between states of significant excess 
demand and excess upply, with most trades taking place in the situation of excess 
supply. At the end of the fifth round, only about 20% of the firms cleared the 
market. The bidding scheme hence failed to reach complete convergence and in 
many respects was rather inelegant. Nevertheless, from a purely practical stand- 
point it was a success in that virtually all voucher points were exchanged for shares 
and only about 8% of shares remained unsold. 
The authorities maintained considerable uncertainty about the price adjustment 
process and the timing of the termination of the voucher scheme. Occasionally (for 
example, between rounds 2 and 3) they overreacted in adjusting prices and caused 
low levels of transactions. On the whole, however, they demonstrated that a scheme 
of this kind is feasible.In an analysis of the determinants of demand for shares by 
the individual investors and IPFs, Svejnar and Singer (1993) find that the 
individual and institutional investors tended to behave quite rationally during the 
rounds of bidding. In the first round, when all share prices were set identically and 
the behaviour of other investors was unknown, the demand of the individuals as 
well as IPFs was guided primarily by background economic indicators of enterprise 
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performance, such as profitability, indebtedness and size. As prices were adjusted 
between rounds, supply (availability) of shares shrank unevenly across firms and 
the extent of excess demand became evident, these time-varying variables 
supplanted the time-invariable background variables as the main determinants of
individuals' and IPFs' demand (bids). 
As we mentioned earlier, the price setting behaviour of the authorities could be 
very closely approximated by a simple equation in excess demand, previous price 
and supply of shares. These findings are consistent with institutional observations 
that the authorities in practice disregarded their elaborate models and used an ad 
hoc price adjustment scheme between the rounds. 
After concluding the last round of the first wave of voucher privatization on 22 
December 1992, the government decided to delay the confirmation of ownership of 
shares 33 until 29 March 1993 - three months after the results of the last round were 
processed and published. This decision was widely criticized as being harmful to 
the privatized enterprises as it significantly delayed the ability of shareholders to 
call their first general meetings. The government thus prolonged the period of vir- 
tually nonexistent supervision of the old, state,appointed management. As we men- 
tioned earlier, things went even worse in the Czech Republic where a dispute with 
the Slovak Republic delayed the confirmation of share ownership until 24 May 
1993. The precarious period between the submitting of projects (which often caused 
struggle inside the management) o the date when new owners would assume 
control over the property thus frequently exceeded two years. This aspect of voucher 
privatization, caused by the need to prepare large amounts of property at once and 
then organize a complex and cumbersome matching procedure, is one of the major 
disadvantages of this method. 
5.2.2. The Second Wave 
As of the writing of this paper, the second wave has been organized in the 
Czech Republic only. In terms of the number of companies and value of assets, the 
second wave will be smaller than the first one. Whereas in the first wave shares 
representing Kcs 212.5 billion of book value of 988 Czech enterprises were 
transacted (the remaining Kcs 86.9 billion of book value reflected Slovak firms), 
the second wave offers shares of 780 to 800 firms representing only 148 to 150 
billion Czech koruna (Kc) in book value. Of this amount, Kc 21.1 billion worth of 
shares are shares of 100 firms that were offered but not sold in the first wave. 
On the other hand, the participation rate of Czech citizens is higher than in the 
first wave: in the first one, 5.83 million citizens registered their vouchers, while 
6.07 million (85% of all eligible citizens) registered their voucher books for the 
second wave. Participants in the second wave of voucher privatization may choose 
from 353 investment and mutual funds, with investment funds numbering 195 and 
mutual funds 158. Only 37 mutual funds are open funds. Of the 264 investment 
funds which took part in the first wave of voucher privatization, 218 have survived 
until now (the rest have mostly merged with larger funds) and 134 entered the sec- 
ond wave. 
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Tab le  15 - THE F IVE  ROUNDS OF  THE F IRST  WAVE OF  VOUCHER PR IVAT IZAT ION 
Czech Slovak Total 
Republic _ Republic 
1. % of Voucher Scheme Shares old in Wave 1 
- Round 1 21 8.8 30.0 
- Round 2 18.1 7,9 25.9 
- Round 3 7.0 3,9 10.8 
- Round 4 8.5 3,9 12.4 
- Round 5 8,1 5,5 13.7 
2. % of Unallocated Voucher Points of Individuals after 
- Round 1 77.2 65.4 73.0 
- Round 2 38.9 34.1 37.5 
- Round 3 24.7 21.8 23.75 
- Round 4 13.6 14.1 13.8 
- Round 5 n,a. n.a. 3.5 
3. % of UnaUocated Voucher Points of IPFs after 
- Round 1 61.3 64.0 61.0 
- Round 2 18.3 25.3 20.2 
- Round 3 7.4 13.3 9.0 
- Round 4 3.8 7.2 4.7 
- Round 5 n.a. n.a. 0.3 
4. % of Available Points Used in Bidding 
- Round 1 91.7 92.6 92.0 
- Round 2 91.0 79.6 88.0 
- Round 3 93.1 96.2 93.0 
- Round 4 87.9 89.7 88.5 
- Round 5 92.1 87.5 90.3 
5. Average Share Price in Points 
- Round 1 33.33 33.33 33.33 
- Round 2 54.00* 21.00" 43.86 
- Round 3 39.22 17.89 31.45 
- Round 4 15.08 11.53 13.76 
- Round 5 15.13 9.12 12.69 
6. No. of Firms that Sold all Shares 
- Round 1 30 18 48 
- Round 2 55 17 72 
- Round 3 24 27 51 
- Round 4 57 22 79 
- Round 5 26 14 40 
7. No. of Firms in Excess Demand 
- Round 1 350 119 469 
- Round 2 342 171 513 
- Round 3 362 145 508 
- Round 4 239 130 369 
- Round 5 99 58 157 
8. No. of Firms in Excess Supply 
- Round 1 638 384 1 022 
- Round 2 615 314 929 
- Round 3 515 295 810 
- Round 4 580 288 868 
- Round 5 719 360 1 079 
* Government estimate. 
Source: Czechoslovak Federal Ministry of Finance as cited in J. Svejnar and M. Singer (1993). 
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5.2.3. Preliminary Results 
Since June 1993, shares distributed through voucher privatization are traded at 
the Prague Stock Exchange (Czech companies) and Bratislava Stock exchange 
(Slovak companies). In both republics, shares are also traded at the automated RM- 
System, based on the infrastructure of registration places from voucher privatiza- 
tion. Both the stock exchange and RM-Systems tarted with a structure of prices 
reached in bidding procedure of voucher privatization. At the start the price level 
was set quite high so that both the RM-System and Stock Exchange were in a situ- 
ation of excess upply. In Prague, prices kept falling until the middle of September 
but have risen significantly since then. At end of December 1993 the index of the 
Prague Stock Exchange xceeded its minimum point by more than 100% and the 
index of the RM-System slightly less than that. The volumes of trading are also 
quite significant. Between 22 June and 16 December, papers for Kc 8,818 million 
changed hands at the Prague Stock Exchange and another Kc 2,904 million at the 
RM-System. 34 Whereas the Prague Stock Exchange trades twice a week, the RM- 
System has three week long rounds; the Stock Exchange is used by institutional 
investors, while the RM-System serves as a retail complement in the system. Prices 
differ across those two markets in some cases by 100% margins, but due to long 
waiting periods in the RM-System, arbitrage is costly. The Slovak market has so far 
exhibited lower prices and thinner volumes: total volume for 1993 has reached only 
44 million Slovak koruna (Ks). 
The most important consequence of privatization, amely the change in corpo- 
rate governance and management behavior is most difficult to observe. The small 
influence of small individual shareholders on management is not surprising. On the 
other hand, some of the largest funds have generally invested into very limited port- 
folios and are exercising their property rights rather actively. However, conclusions 
about the effects of voucher privatization on management and efficiency of former 
state owned enterprises may be drawn only on the basis of systematic studies of 
economic performance which have not yet been carried out. 
5.2.4. Voucher Privatization: The Next Step 
The bidding phase of the second wave will start in March 1994. Since the par- 
ticipants of this wave may have learned in the first wave, their behaviour and hence 
the dynamics of the second wave may be quite different. The following factors may 
also play an important part in the second wave: 
- IPFs generally honored their promises but with delays and, in some cases, they 
paid smaller amounts than promised; 35 
- funds are promising less in second wave; after poor start of zero round, several 
funds started to pay cash in advance, which attracted a lot of people. In contrast 
to 10,000 and more promised in the first wave, Harvard funds pay now 3,000. 
The highest offer is 7,000 Kc; 
- prices of the shares at both Czech stockmarkets are relatively high. The shares 
gained by a well-invested voucher in the first wave can be sold for as much as 
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200,000 Kc; 
- shares of funds that have been traded at the stock market show lower prices and 
weaker trading. Yet since their rise in December, shares of companies are do- 
ing better. 
These factors generally contribute to the lowering of the share of funds. Unless 
the higher total participation of citizens in wave two reverses this trend, the second 
wave may display different characteristics from the first one. According to Singer 
and Svejnar's (1993) estimations, funds and individual bidders showed different 
demand strategies, with individuals having higher price elasticity and the funds 
tending to bid for finns with a high number of shares offered in each round. Funds 
were hence taking into account he strategic aspect hat their sizable investment 
decisions could bring about excess demand in situations of limited share supply. 
5.3. Large Scale Privatization: Achievements and Problems 
The size of the Czechoslovak large scale privatization program is unprecedented 
in the world. As a result, it is naturally impossible to undertake a comparative 
evaluation of the process and its outcome. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the 
Czechs and Slovaks have proved that a large scale transfer of ownership rogram of 
this kind is feasible and can be carried out in a relatively short period of time. The 
main problems associated with the Czechoslovak scheme appear to have been the 
following: 
The legislative framework for large scale privatization, especially for the 
voucher component, was too vague. Most of the laws spelled out general principles, 
relegating details to government decrees and ad hoc administrative decisions. This 
gave the governments great discretionary power which lent itself to abuse. As an 
example, the timing and method of concluding the first wave of voucher privatiza- 
tion was determined fully by a handful of officials. Investors were told that the 
voucher scheme could be concluded at any time with an ex post announcement from 
this group, with their leftover voucher points becoming worthless. 
Voucher privatization also turned out to be difficult to organize. One of the im- 
portant advantages, expected by the Czechoslovak authorities when the method was 
accepted, was that the use of this method could turn the difficult decision process of 
'whom to sell to' into an easier approval process of 'whether to privatize this en- 
terprise or not'. However, as soon as the method started to compete and was being 
combined with other, standard methods, this expected advantage disappeared. The 
consequence was a difficult process that permitted corruption to appear. 
On the other hand, one may argue that using the voucher method as a single pri- 
vatization tool would have been too risky and that the complications brought about 
by the use of a combination of methods are more than outweighed by the benefits of 
diversification. 
An important positive result is that in spite of predictions of :many economists, 
no massive sell out of shares has so far occurred. Stock prices have shown consid- 
erable fluctuations as might be expected with new issues, but there has so far been 
no major sell off of shares. 
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6. The Role of  Foreign Investment in Pr ivat izat ion 
Foreign capital plays a part in the emerging private sector of the Czech and Slo- 
vak republics. According to the Czech National Bank, the total 1992 inflow of for- 
eign investment was about US$1.1 billion, over 90% of which went to the Czech 
republic and over 9% to Slovakia. In first nine months of 1993, another US$455 
million came to the Czech republic as direct foreign investment. Since the begin- 
ning of the transition process in 1990, foreign investment has totalled US$2 billion, 
to the Czech economy only. The inflow of western capital has thus been relatively 
modest so far and most of it has located in the Czech republic. 
There has also been an interesting dynamics in the national composition of for- 
eign capital. Whereas for the entire 1990-92 period German capital ranks as the 
most important source of foreign investment (38.5% of the total), in 1992 the most 
active investors were the Americans (27.2%) and French (20.7%), leaving the 
Germans in the third place with 16.9% of total foreign investment. Czechoslovakia 
has thus enjoyed a significant investment inflow from its economically advanced 
neighbour, but increasingly it has also benefited from a diversified foreign invest- 
ment base. 
The most frequent avenues through which foreign capital has been entering the 
Czech and Slovak economies are: 
- the formation of joint ventures with existing enterprises; 
- the establishment of new firms or affiliations; 
- the purchase of existing firms within the privatization process. 
The process of establishing new firms and joint ventures has been gradually de- 
regulated so that at present no formal government approval is necessary. Several 
thousand fully or partly foreign-owned firms are now registered, although most of 
them are 'empty shells' that have never started business activities. 
Foreign participation i the privatization process has been restricted within each 
privatization program. Foreign citizens are not entitled to claim restitution demands 
and their bidding is subjected to special rules in the small privatization. Within 
large scale privatization foreign bidders can generally take part in any form of pri- 
vatization with the exception of methods leading to free distribution of property. 
This means prevailingly free transfers and direct involvement in voucher privatiza- 
tion. On the other hand, foreign companies could establish investment privatization 
funds and some of them, like Austrian Creditanstalt, became one of the most suc- 
cessful ones. 
The purchase of state-owned firms and creation of joint ventures with firms 
going through the privatization process has been legally more difficult. In our dis- 
cussion of small and large scale privatization, we have outlined the nature of these 
difficulties. Despite the fact that some clandestine purchases through Czechoslovak 
citizens may have taken place, the exclusion of foreign capital from the first wave 
of auctions in small scale privatization makes foreign investment in these units 
likely to be negligible. The centralized nature of large scale privatization generates 
better information. As can be seen from Table 16, the total number of 102 approved 
foreign projects does not look impressive in comparison with the thousands of firms 
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that are being privatized. However, many of the foreign projects are of key 
importance. 
For instance, in 1991 Volkswagen acquired 31% of shares in the Czech car 
maker, Skoda Mlada Boleslav, for over US$300 million. Skoda was responsible for 
5% of the country's exports and so far the deal has been the largest one in the 
Czech and Slovak republics. The commitments of Votkswagen's future investment 
in the venture xceed US$1 billion over the following five years, although the can- 
cellation by Volkswagen of a major loan for Skoda in 1993 has cast doubt on the 
seriousness of this commitment. 
Two other widely publicized cases were the sales of the entire detergent factory 
Rakona to Procter & Gamble and of Maj, one of largest department s ores in Pra- 
gue, to K-Mart. In both cases the sale price was around US$10 million with com- 
mitments for additional investment amounting to a multiple of this price. 
Foreign investors also entered into enterprises included in voucher privatizafion. 
In 37 out of the 988 Czech enterprises and 8 out of the 503 Slovak enterprises 
involved in the first wave of voucher privatization, the voucher method was com- 
plemented by a direct sale of some proportion of shares to a foreign investor. In 
many other cases, foreign investors entered later by directly purchasing shares of 
companies from the Funds of National Property or from intermediaries through 
whom the Funds also sell shares. Table 17 illustrates three cases where the voucher 
method was complemented with a significant minority or majority foreign owner- 
ship. 
Conclusions 
The Czech and Slovak privatization program has provided an answer to one of 
the most hotly disputed practical propositions of this decade, namely whether it is 
possible to privatize a large part of a virtually completely state-owned economy 
within a short time span. After forty years of virtually no experience with private 
ownership, a new and inexperienced government assembled and rapidly imple- 
mented three complementary privatization programs that transferred state owner- 
ship to individuals, groups and the population at large. 
One of the main lessons of our examination of the Czech and Slovak experience 
is that the determination f a strong government to privatize was an essential ele- 
ment of the success. Indeed, the design of the privatization programs had arguably 
many flaws and the Czechs and Slovaks encountered numerous difficulties (many 
of their own doing) in implementing the relatively complex schemes of transferring 
ownership. Yet, the government's perseverance and problem-solving approach cre- 
ated an atmosphere of credibility and trust that generated and maintained the neces- 
sary public support for the program. 
The main challenge facing the Czech and Slovak governments i  to complete 
the program of large scale privatization and provide an environment conducive to 
efficiency gains that should result from the new system of ownership. The double 
digit and rising unemployment rate in Slovakia, as well as the political-economic 
orientation of the Slovak government, has generated a certain opposition to further 
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mass privatization in that country. At present, the course appears steady in the 
Czech republic and somewhat uncertain in Slovakia. 
The second part of the challenge concerns the efficiency gains that are expected 
to stem from the privatization program. The introduction of a multitude of flexible 
and responsive small firms in the restitution and small scale pfivafization programs 
has produced immediate and visible welfare gains. The short term efficiency out- 
come in large scale privatization is less certain, however, as the delay in transfer- 
r ing property rights and the dispersed nature of the new ownership may not rapidly 
generate the desired control over (mostly state appointed) management. The ability 
to convert the massive transfer of ownership into rapid and sustained efficiency 
gains in the economy is the next challenge in the Czech and Slovak transition proc- 
ess. 
This paper was received on 15 January 1994. 
Notes 
1 After the partition of Czechoslovakia into independent Czech and Slovak republics on 
1 January 1993, it has been much more difficult to obtain information on the progress of 
privatization i Slovakia than in the Czech republic. As a result, for 1993 our discussion of 
the Slovak case is less detailed than that of the Czech case. 
2 The Federal Fund was created by law 92/1991 on 26 February 1991, and its operation 
legally started on 1 April 1991. The Czech Fund was established by law no. 171/191 on 23 
April 1991 and its operation became effective on 24 May 1991. The Slovak Fund was 
established by law no. 253/1991 on 24 May 1991, and became legally effective on 28 June 
1991. 
3 See Svejnar J. and M. Singer (1993) for an analysis of this price setting behaviour. 
4 These fears had, at least in part, materialized. For example, in Prague's District 4, 
70% of all contracts returning buildings from the state to the previous owners or their heirs 
were not accepted by the notary because of legal problems in these signed contracts. Of 
approximately 1,000 claims, only 150 resulted in the return of the property as of 30 
September 1991 [Respekt, 21-27 October 1991]. Yet, according to the Czech Ministry of 
Privatization, restitutions have been a much faster vehicle of privatization than the auction 
method used in small privatization. 
5 Many professional economists have for instance opposed restitutions. David Begg 
(1991) spoke for many when he declared that he, 'see(s) no moral case for restitution. 
Previous owners did lose out...But others lost out too'. Before the law on restitutions was 
passed through the federal Parliament, two dozen Czech and Slovak economists (among 
them two federal, three Czech and two Slovak ministers) questioned the technical feasibility 
of mass restitutions. In the end the law passed with the support of all parliamentary parties 
exc~t he communists. 
°One of the most controversial issues is the exclusion of former Czechoslovak citizens, 
who lost their citizenship as a result of communist, now unconstitutional, laws. Although 
there have been many initiatives to allow restitutions for those former Czechoslovak citizens, 
who lost their citizenship under communism, so far these initiatives have not been 
successful. The initiatives have the support of conservative and liberal political parties. 
7 The confiscation of personal property was a standard legal punishment in cases such as 
an 'illegal leaving the republic'. Although significant politically, the amount of property 
returned under this law is relatively small. 
8 In contrast, historical records are very good. Historical registration of deeds started in 
the 13th century and the modem form of registration was principally unchanged since the 
mid- 1700s. 
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9 See for example, Gacs J., Karimov I.A. and H. Schneider (1993) for an overview and 
comparison of small scale privatization programs in Central and Eastern Europe. For a 
broader comparison, see e.g., Voszka E. (1993). 
10 The survey was carried out in January 1990 by AISA, the Association for Independent 
Social Analysis, Prague. The results were based on questionnaires filled out by 2,370 
respondents. 
11 Czechoslovak Economic Digest 2/1991 (English translation). The competencies of the 
republican governments in small privatization were articulated by laws no. 500/1990 in the 
Czech republic and no. 427/1990 in the Slovak republic. 
12 Since October 1991 the two year period has been extended to five years for newly 
auctioned business units. Previous transactions may have the time of the lease reconsidered 
in the sense of this legal change, but only with approval of present owner of the building 
and/or land. 
13 Therefore, refugees from communist persecution who returned to Czechoslovakia are 
eligible under this law. Those who would not become permanent residents in 
Czechoslovakia are not. 
14 The Committees have been established and their jurisdiction is defined by republican 
laws no. 20/1990 of the Czech Parliament and no. 20/1990 of the Slovak Parliament. 
15 The law limits the auctioning of property which was legally leased, provided the 
contract was completed before 1 October 1990. In such cases the lessor can buy the property 
without auction. In practice, many contracts were signed later and predated. The 
privatization committees tend not to respect he ban of auction when they do have a 
suspicion (but not a proof) that the lease was falsely dated. The Ministry of Privatization 
cannot ignore the law, however, which has in turn caused significant tensions between the 
Ministries and committees. 
I6 This condition has been exploited by some employees of businesses that were 
scheduled for privatization i  order to delay privatization. By bidding the highest price 
without an intention to buy, they effectively delayed privatization by 4 or even more months. 
The penalty for not buying was the forfeiting of the security (escrow) deposit, i.e., 10% of 
the starting price. Since October 1991 the possible penalty has been increased to one-third of 
the actually reached price, which often exceeds the starting price by a factor of 5 or even 10. 
17 See for example Dyba K. and J. Svejnar (1993). 
18 Borensztein E. and M. Kumar (1991) in their classification of privatization proposals 
mention only one proposal that does not fall into this category. This reflects to a large extent 
the orientation of the papers and proposals published in the West. 
19 This form of privafization has been the dominant one in Germany (together with 
restitutions), Hungary (together with spontaneous privatization) and, until recently, Poland. 
The German reliance on standard methods follows from significant domestic apital base, 
entrepreneurial class and administrative might. Hungary, on the other hand, has been 
remarkable in its tolerance of spontaneous pfivafization and willingness to proceed 
gradually. Poland used a piecemeal pproach to privatization while formulating its approach 
to large scale privatization. Recently, the Polish Parliament approved mass free distribution 
of prooerty. 
2ffA summary of arguments presented in this internal document may be found in 
Komarek V. et. el. (1990). 
21 Attitudes towards spontaneous pfivatization have differed significantly across 
countries: in Poland and Czechoslovakia this form of privatization has tended not to be 
tolerated by mainstream politicians (for the Polish case, see Da$browski M., 1991), whereas 
in Hungary it was at first by and large tolerated [see Kiss K., 1991] and Hungarian 
Economy, no. 2, 1991. However, as Dervis K. and T. Condon (1993) show, even in Hungary 
popular discontent has limited the reliance on this method since 1992. 
22 See 'Iniciativni material ke koncepci deetatizace a privatizace', signed by the Union 
of Industry of the CR and SR and by the Union of State-Owned Enterprises and Joint Stock 
Companies and dated 4 July 1990. 
23 Published in Tydenik Hospodarskych novin, (1991), no. t2. 
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24 The 'Lists of Enterprises' were published in Tydenik Hospodarskych novin, (1991), 
nos. 31, 32, 37, 39 and 40. 
25 Until 1 January 1993, federal property was referred for a final decision to the Federal 
MinisLry of Finance. 
26 The Ministry of Privatization of the Czech Republic issued a prototype of a 
privatization project [published in Tydenik Hospodarskych novin, (1991), no. 29], specifying 
the content and form of the project. A similar document was issued in Slovakia [Tydenik 
Hospodarskych novin, (1991), no. 38]. 
27 In the Czech Republic, for instance, a Regulation of Prices of Real Assets was issued 
by the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic on 5 September 1991 [published in 
Hospodarske noviny, 13 September 1991]. This regulation increased official prices to a 
multiple of their former level. 
28 In the first (1992) wave, federal property was transferred into the Federal Fund for 
National Property. 
29 Among the most prominent scandals was the purchase of a wholesale book 
distributorship bythe then vice premier of the federal government. The purchase was carried 
out for a nominal price but the distributorship included real estate in downtown Prague with 
an estimated market value of hundreds of millions Kcs. 
30 Federally owned property was also privatized mostly in combination with at least two 
other methods. 
31 Of the 948 projects reported in Table 12, 943 entered the first wave and 5 were 
approved at the end of 1992 for the second wave of voucher privatization. 
32 The Czech Savings and Loans Bank for instance offered immediate credit of Kcs 
10,000 to voucher holders who placed their points with its IPF. 
33 In each company the shareholders decide whether shares will be issued physically or 
allocated and traded in a computerized system. 
34 Prague Stock Exchange was closed on 16 December; trading resumed on 6 January. 
35 The famous Harvard funds, promising voucher holders Kcs 10,350 within a year tried 
to delay payments through a variety of legal manoeuvres. Just before voucher holders could 
opt for IPFs for the second wave, Harvard started to pay out the promised sum in an attempt 
to improve its chances. Surprisingly enough, a small fund which promised to pay Kcs 31,050 
for each voucher book has been buying out its shares at the promised price. 
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